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BRIEF ARTICLE
Learning to fear a second-order stimulus following vicarious learning
Gemma Reynoldsa* , Andy P. Fieldb and Chris Askewa
aDepartment of Psychology, Kingston University, Kingston-upon-Thames, Surrey, UK; bSchool of Psychology, University of Sussex,
Brighton, UK
ABSTRACT
Vicarious fear learning refers to the acquisition of fear via observation of the fearful
responses of others. The present study aims to extend current knowledge by
exploring whether second-order vicarious fear learning can be demonstrated in
children. That is, whether vicariously learnt fear responses for one stimulus can be
elicited in a second stimulus associated with that initial stimulus. Results
demonstrated that children’s (5–11 years) fear responses for marsupials and
caterpillars increased when they were seen with fearful faces compared to no faces.
Additionally, the results indicated a second-order effect in which fear-related
learning occurred for other animals seen together with the fear-paired animal, even
though the animals were never observed with fearful faces themselves. Overall, the
ﬁndings indicate that for children in this age group vicariously learnt fear-related
responses for one stimulus can subsequently be observed for a second stimulus
without it being experienced in a fear-related vicarious learning event. These
ﬁndings may help to explain why some individuals do not recall involvement of a
traumatic learning episode in the development of their fear of a speciﬁc stimulus.
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Vicarious fear learning refers to the process of learning
fear through observing the fearful reactions of others.
In the 1980s and 1990s, Mineka and Cook provided
signiﬁcant support for the acquisition of fear in
rhesus monkeys via vicarious learning (e.g. Cook &
Mineka, 1987; Mineka & Cook, 1993). They showed
that rhesus monkeys that were reared in a laboratory
did not show the fear of snakes that is evident in
rhesus monkeys in the wild but rapidly acquired an
intense fear of snakes when observing wild-reared
monkeys behave fearfully in the presence of a snake
(see Mineka & Cook, 1988, for a review). Subsequently,
robust vicarious fear learning effects have been widely
documented in children (e.g. Askew, Dunne, Özdil,
Reynolds, & Field, 2013; Askew & Field, 2007; Askew,
Kessock-Philip, & Field, 2008; Dunne & Askew, 2013;
Reynolds, Field, & Askew, 2014).
Like direct conditioning, vicarious learning is
argued to be underpinned by associative learning
mechanisms (e.g. Askew & Field, 2008; Field, 2006;
Mineka & Cook, 1993); however, research is required
to establish which characteristics of associative learn-
ing are speciﬁcally shared by vicarious learning. One
such potential characteristic is second-order con-
ditioning (Rescorla, 1980): a type of higher order con-
ditioning whereby a learnt response to one stimulus is
also found for a second stimulus with which it sub-
sequently becomes associated. That is, initial training
(ﬁrst-order conditioning) involves pairing a neutral
conditioned stimulus (CS1) with a traumatic uncondi-
tioned stimulus (US) and consequently the CS1 elicits
a conditioned response (CR). This is then followed by
second-order conditioning whereby CS1 is paired
with a second neutral stimulus (CS2). If successful,
this second-order conditioning leads to CS2 becoming
associated with CS1 and therefore CS2 elicits a CR
similar to that elicited by CS1 despite not being
exposed to the original US. Second-order conditioning
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is thus a process through which learned fears can, via
additional associations, transfer to other stimuli and
contribute to the development of clinical anxiety pat-
terns. It has been widely demonstrated, particularly in
rats (e.g. Rizley & Rescorla, 1972), but also humans (e.g.
Davey & Arulampalam, 1982).
Second-order conditioning following vicarious
learning has been demonstrated in monkeys. Cook
and Mineka (1987) ﬁrst exposed rhesus monkeys to
vicarious learning that resulted in the acquisition of
a fear of snakes. The monkeys were then exposed
to six sessions of second-order conditioning
whereby a black-striped box (the second-order CS)
was paired with a snake (ﬁrst-order CS). Results
demonstrated small but signiﬁcant levels of fear con-
ditioned to the second-order CS. These results
showed that fear can be elicited after the presen-
tation of a second stimulus if this stimulus has been
presented contiguously with the feared stimulus,
even though this second stimulus has never received
conditioning with an aversive US.
The fear associated with the second stimulus was
not as robust as that associated with the feared stimu-
lus, reminiscent of early ﬁndings of second-order con-
ditioning following direct ﬁrst-order classical
conditioning. Arguably, this may be the result of too
many second-order conditioning pairings leading to
the second-order CS acquiring inhibitory properties
causing extinction of the CR (e.g. Rescorla, 1980). Alter-
natively, Cook and Mineka (1987) use Seligman’s
(1971) theory of preparedness to argue that the
second stimulus lacked fear relevance, and thus
failed to elicit a strong fear response. It makes sense
from an evolutionary perspective that only fear-rel-
evant stimuli pose a threat to the survival of
monkeys and thus vicarious learning would only
occur for these fear-relevant stimuli, and this has
received wide support (e.g. Mineka & Öhman, 2002;
however, see also Askew et al., 2013).
Demonstration of second-order conditioning in
vicarious learning in children would expand under-
standing of the parallels between direct conditioning
and vicarious learning, and add to knowledge about
the role of vicarious learning in children’s fears.
That is, evidence for second-order conditioning fol-
lowing vicarious fear learning would demonstrate
how additional stimuli may become feared without
being involved in the original vicarious learning situ-
ation. Research has suggested that some fears may
be the result of second-order conditioning rather
than ﬁrst-order conditioning (e.g. Cook & Mineka,
1987; Rizley & Rescorla, 1972) and therefore the
feared stimulus may never have been directly
paired with a traumatic event. For example, Davey
and Arulampalam (1982) used aversive electrodermal
conditioning to demonstrate ﬁrst-order conditioned
skin conductance responses following pairings of a
triangle (CS1) with an aversive loud noise (US), fol-
lowed by second-order conditioned skin conductance
responses to a different ﬁgure (CS2) that was only
ever paired with CS1 and never with the US. Clinically,
second-order conditioning could explain why many
phobic individuals cannot recall a traumatic experi-
ence with their feared stimulus: because learning
occurred via a second stimulus rather than through
experiencing an aversive event directly (see Davey,
1997). In which case, clinical interventions should
target breaking the association between these two
stimuli.
Second-order vicarious fear learning has been
demonstrated in monkeys (Cook & Mineka, 1987)
but never in children and would (1) indicate that vicar-
iously learnt fear responses for one stimulus can be eli-
cited in a second associated with that stimulus, (2)
explain why phobic individuals often have no
memory of a negative learning experience with their
feared stimulus and (3) suggest how interventions
might be more speciﬁcally targeted. Therefore, in
line with previous research demonstrating second-
order conditioning following vicarious fear learning
in monkeys, the current experiment predicted that
increases in fear-related responses (fear cognitions,
avoidance preferences and behavioural avoidance)
for a fear-paired animal (CS1
+) would also be found
for a second animal (CS2
+; second-order stimulus)
never seen with fearful faces (US) if it is presented
together with the ﬁrst stimulus (CS1
+).
Methods
Participants
Fifty-two children from a primary school in Basildon,
Essex (29 males and 23 females) with an age range
of 7.2–9.15 years with a mean of 96.96 (SD = 7.48)
months took part in the experiment. Parents were
given consent forms to sign on an opt-in basis, 2
weeks prior to the research. Only children with
signed consent forms participated, and all children
gave verbal assent before they began the study. The
study was approved by a Kingston University,
London ethics committee.
2 G. REYNOLDS ET AL.
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [K
ing
sto
n U
niv
ers
ity
 L
ibr
ary
] a
t 0
0:3
6 1
6 D
ec
em
be
r 2
01
5 
Materials
The majority of the study was automated, using a pro-
gramme written in E-Prime 2.0 by the ﬁrst author, on a
Samsung RF511 Laptop and a ProLite T2451MTS 24 in.
Touchscreen Monitor.
Animals
Two Australian marsupials (a quokka and a cuscus)
and two caterpillars (an automeris and a nymphalis)
were used as CSs. These marsupials are unlikely to
be known by most UK children, ensuring that they
did not have pre-existing fear beliefs. Although, like
marsupials, children may be familiar with caterpillars
generally, the types used in the current research are
unlikely to be familiar to UK children. All four
animals have been successfully used in previous
similar vicarious learning studies (see e.g. Askew
et al., 2013; Askew & Field, 2007; Dunne & Askew,
2013). Ten colour pictures of each animal, measuring
346 pixels wide by 444 pixels high, were used. The
study was counterbalanced so that for half the chil-
dren, marsupials were used as CS1 and pictures of
caterpillars as CS2 and for half the children caterpillars
were used as CS1 and marsupials as CS2.
Faces
Ten pictures (also measuring 346 × 444) of scared
adult faces (ﬁve males and ﬁve females) were taken
from the NimStim Face Stimulus Set (Tottenham,
Borscheid, Ellertsen, Marcus, & Nelson, 2002) to use
as USs during vicarious learning.
Fear Beliefs Questionnaire
An automated Fear Beliefs Questionnaire (FBQ: Field &
Lawson, 2003) was used to measure fear beliefs for the
four animals twice during the experiment. The FBQ
includes seven questions for each animal (28 in
total); for example, “Would you keep your distance if
you saw a QUOKKA?”, and was displayed on the
monitor with a picture of the marsupial or caterpillar
in question. Children responded on a 5-point Likert
scale (0 = “No, not at all”, 1 = “No, not really”, 2
= “Don’t know/Neither”, 3 = “Yes, probably”, 4 = “Yes,
deﬁnitely”) by touching the screen. Internal consist-
ency was high before vicarious learning: Cronbach’s
α = .67 (Quokka subscale), .77 (Cuscus subscale), .78
(Automeris subscale) and .81 (Nymphalis subscale);
and after learning: α = .81, .82, .85 and .79, respectively.
Nature Reserve Task
The nature reserve task (NRT; Field & Storksen-
Coulson, 2007) comprised of a rectangular board
(680 mm× 500 mm) covered with green felt and pipe
cleaner trees and fences representing a nature
reserve. The children were asked to imagine that the
embellished board was a nature reserve containing
one of the marsupials or caterpillars, represented by a
picture, at the end of the reserve. They then placed a
plastic ﬁgure representing themselves in the reserve
to determine how near or far from the animal they
would prefer to be. The distance between the ﬁgure
and picture of the marsupial/caterpillar was measured
to determine avoidance preference. The procedure
was repeated for the four animals; the order of presen-
tation was counterbalanced across participants.
Behavioural Avoidance Task
The behavioural avoidance task (BAT: Field & Lawson,
2003, see Askew & Field, 2007; Field & Lawson, 2003;
Kelly, Barker, Field, Wilson, & Reynolds, 2010) com-
prised of four pet-carrier boxes (size: 260 mm ×
460 mm× 340 mm) ostensibly containing the marsu-
pials and caterpillars, complete with breathing holes
and one larger hole (diameter: 14 cm) covered with
hessian as a touch hole. A picture of each caterpillar
and marsupial was displayed on the box. Children
began the task by standing on a line placed 1 m
from the boxes. Children were given 15 s to approach
the ﬁrst box and put their hand into the box up to their
wrist. The time it took to approach the box was taken
during these 15 s. If the child did not approach the box
within 15 s, it was taken that they did not wish to
approach that animal. Children returned back to the
line and repeated the procedure for the remaining
three boxes.
Procedure
The experiment lasted approximately 20 min and took
place in a quiet room of the school with each child par-
ticipating individually. Children ﬁrst completed the ﬁrst
NRT followed by the ﬁrst FBQ to assess baseline avoid-
ance preferences and fear cognitions for marsupials
and caterpillars. Vicarious learning consisted of 10 pre-
sentations of pictures of one marsupial or caterpillar
(CS1
+) on the left side of the screen together with a
scared face (fear US) on the right side of the screen,
and 10 pictures of the second marsupial or caterpillar
presented alone on the left-hand side of the screen
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(CS1
−). The animal appeared ﬁrst for 1 s, accompanied
by the picture of the face (or no face) for a further 1 s.
There was a variable inter-trial interval of between 2
and 4 s (see Askew & Field, 2007; Askew et al., 2008).
Trials were presented in random order and whether
the animal was fear-paired or unpaired was counterba-
lanced across children.
Directly following vicarious learning, with no inter-
val, children were presented with the second-order
conditioning phase. This phase was structurally identi-
cal to vicarious learning, using the same number of
trials used in initial conditioning in order to maintain
consistency across conditioning sessions. Using the
same number of trials as conditioning also prevents
conditioned inhibition potentially accruing to the
second-order stimulus, which can happen if the
second-order conditioning phase contains substan-
tially more trials than the original conditioning
phase. For children who were presented with pictures
of marsupials during vicarious learning, one of the
caterpillars (CS2
+) was presented with pictures of the
previously fear-paired marsupial (CS1
+) for 10 pairing
trials, and pictures of the second caterpillar (CS2
−)
were presented together with the previously unpaired
marsupial (CS1
−) for 10 pairing trials. The location of the
stimuli on the left- or right-hand side of the screen was
randomised. For children who were initially presented
with pictures of caterpillars during vicarious learning,
pictures of marsupials were displayed during this
phase. Presentation method, trial length and inter-
trial intervals were the same as for vicarious learning.
Following this, the FBQ and NRT were completed
for a second time for marsupials and caterpillars to
explore changes in fear beliefs and avoidance prefer-
ences resulting from vicarious learning and second-
order conditioning. Finally, children were invited to
participate in the BAT. At the end of the experiment,
all children were fully debriefed with verbal expla-
nations, written information and age-appropriate
worksheets, so that any false impressions about the
marsupials or caterpillars were corrected. Children
were also shown that the pet-carrier boxes did not
contain the animals and were actually empty.
Results
A rejection criterion of α = .05 was used for all analyses
and effect sizes (r) are reported. Cohen’s (1988) sug-
gestions about what constitutes a large or small
effect are: r = .10 is a small effect; r = .30 is a medium
effect and r = .50 is a large effect.
Fear beliefs
Figure 1 shows the mean fear-belief scores for the CS1
+,
CS1
−, CS2
+ and CS2
− before and after vicarious learning,
and shows increases in fear beliefs following vicarious
learning for CS1
+ (pre-learning,M = 1.90, SD = 0.91, 95%
CI [1.65, 2.15], post-learning, M = 2.51, SD = 0.98, 95%
CI [2.25, 2.77]) and to a slightly lesser extent, for CS2
+
(pre-learning, M= 1.91, SD = 0.90, 95% CI [1.67, 2.16],
post-learning, M = 2.29, SD = 1.08, 95% CI [2.00,
2.59]). There were small increases in fear beliefs for
CS1
− (pre-learning, M= 1.89, SD = 0.90, 95% CI [1.64,
2.14], post-learning M = 1.96, SD = 1.00, 95% CI [1.71,
2.22]) and CS2
− (pre-learning, M = 1.81, SD = 1.04, 95%
CI [1.52, 2.10], post-learning, M = 1.93, SD = 1.01, 95%
CI [1.65, 2.20]).
A four-way 2 (time: pre-learning vs. post-learning) ×
2 (pairing type: fear vs. unpaired) × 2 (stimulus: CS1 vs.
CS2) × 2 (animal type: marsupial vs. caterpillar) mixed
ANOVA with repeated measures on the ﬁrst three vari-
ables was conducted on average fear-belief scores.
Initially, age was entered as a covariate but did not sig-
niﬁcantly predict fear beliefs and was not included in
further analyses. Results indicated a signiﬁcant main
effect of time, F(1, 50) = 19.30, p < .001, r = .53, and
pairing type, F(1, 50) = 13.55, p = .001, r = .46, but
no signiﬁcant main effect of stimulus (F < 1). The
time × stimulus and pairing × stimulus interactions
were non-signiﬁcant, (Fs < 1). The time × pairing type
interaction was signiﬁcant, F(1, 50) = 15.05, p < .001,
r = .48, indicating vicariously learnt increases in
fear beliefs for paired stimuli (CS1
+ and CS2
+) compared
to unpaired stimuli (CS1
− and CS2
−). There was no
Figure 1. Mean (and SE) fear-belief scores for CS1
+, CS1
−, CS2
+ and CS2
−
before and after learning.
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signiﬁcant time × stimulus × pairing type interaction,
F(1, 50) = 2.31, p = .14, r = .21, so vicarious learning
was not signiﬁcantly different for CS2 compared
to CS1.
Because the demonstration of equivalent learning
in standard vicarious learning and second-order con-
ditioning hinged on a null effect, we computed a
Bayes factor for the three-way interaction. Rather
than asking whether or not this interaction is signiﬁ-
cant, this statistic quantiﬁes the ratio of the probability
of the data under the alternative hypothesis relative to
the null. A value of 1 means that the probability of the
data is equal under the null and alternative hypoth-
eses, values above 1 suggest that the probability of
the data is greater under the alternative hypotheses
relative to the null and values below 1 suggest that
the probability of the data is greater under the null
hypotheses relative to the alternative. The Bayes factor
was computed using the anovaBF function in the Bayes-
Factor (Morey & Rouder, 2014) package in R (R Core
Team, 2015). This function uses a default Jeffreys prior
(Rouder, Morey, Speckman, & Province, 2012). The
Bayes factor for the three-way interaction term was
0.287 (±2.36%), suggesting strongly that the probability
of the data is greater under the null hypothesis than the
alternative hypothesis. This ﬁnding supports the
hypothesis that the data indicate equivalent condition-
ing in directly conditioned and second-order CSs.
There were no signiﬁcant main effects or inter-
actions with animal type, with the exception of a sig-
niﬁcant stimulus × animal type interaction, F(1, 50) =
15.36, p < .001, r = .48; therefore, there was no indi-
cation that learning was signiﬁcantly greater for one
animal type compared to another. Taken together,
these results provide evidence for second-order fear
conditioning.
Avoidance preferences
Figure 2 shows the mean distance (mm) on the nature
reserve board from each CS1 and CS2. The graph
demonstrates an increase in avoidance preferences
for CS1
+ (pre-learning, M = 348.12, SD = 213.60, 95% CI
[288.03, 408.20], post-learning, M = 362.25, SD =
215.77, 95% CI [301.73, 422.77]) and CS2
+ (pre-learning,
M = 287.50, SD = 171.62, 95% CI [239.80, 335.21], post-
learning, M = 313.13, SD = 179.82, 95% CI [263.33,
362.94]) and a decrease in avoidance preferences for
CS1
− (pre-learning, M = 303.63, SD = 194.94, 95% CI
[250.16, 357.11], post-learning, M = 264.10, SD =
189.67, 95% CI [215.12, 313.07]). There was also a
decrease in avoidance preferences over time for CS2
−
(pre-learning, M = 331.90, SD = 180.93, 95% CI
[281.97, 381.84], post-learning, M = 295.92, SD =
186.37, 95% CI [243.90, 347.95]).
A four-way 2(time: pre-learning vs. post-learning) ×
2(pairing type: fear vs. unpaired) × 2(stimulus: CS1 vs.
CS2) × 2(animal type: marsupial vs. caterpillar) mixed
ANOVA, with repeated measures on the ﬁrst three
variables, conducted on average distances (mm)
from each marsupial and caterpillar CS in the NRT indi-
cated no signiﬁcant main effects of stimulus or time (F
< 1), but there was a signiﬁcant main effect of pairing
type, F(1, 50) = 5.14, p = .03, r = .31. More important, a
signiﬁcant time × pairing interaction showed a signiﬁ-
cant vicarious learning effect in which increases in
avoidance preferences for paired CSs were greater
than for unpaired CSs, F(1, 50) = 11.88, p = .001, r
= .44. The pairing type × stimulus interaction was
also signiﬁcant, F(1, 50) = 11.19, p = .002, r = .43.
However, there was no signiﬁcant time × stimulus
interaction, or time × stimulus × pairing type inter-
action (Fs < 1), demonstrating that although avoid-
ance preferences increased over time for paired
stimuli (CS1
+ and CS2
+) compared to unpaired stimuli
(CS1
− and CS2
−), there was no signiﬁcant difference
in increases for CS1 compared to CS2. The Bayes
factor for the critical three-way interaction was
0.201 (±0.94%), which strongly suggests that the
probability of the data was greater under the null
hypothesis than the alternative. Analyses with
animal type indicated a signiﬁcant stimulus ×
animal type interaction, F(1, 50) = 6.44, p = .01, r
= .34, pairing type × animal type interaction, F(1,
Figure 2.Mean distances (mm) from CS1
+, CS1
−, CS2
+ and CS2
− in the NRT
before and after learning.
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50) = 4.03, p = .05, r = .27, stimulus × pairing type ×
animal type interaction, F(1, 50) = 4.11, p = .048, r
= .28, but these effects did not include an interaction
with time.
Behavioural avoidance
Only 5 of 52 children opted to take part in the touch
box task and all ﬁve children placed their hand in
each of the four boxes. The remaining 47 children
did not wish to approach the animals. Due to the
small numbers of children opting to approach the
animals, the BAT results could not be analysed.
Discussion
The current experiment explored whether fear-related
responses toa second-order stimuluscouldoccur follow-
ing vicarious fear learning. Analysis of fear-belief
responses replicated previous research (e.g. Askew &
Field, 2007) showing that children’s fear beliefs for mar-
supials and caterpillars increase when they see them
with fearful faces compared to seeing them with no
faces. Avoidance preference results were also in-line
with previous studies (e.g. Reynolds et al., 2014),
showing increased avoidance following vicarious learn-
ing. Thus, seeing someone responding fearfully to a
novel stimulus increases children’s fear beliefs and
avoidance preferences for that stimulus. Furthermore,
the results indicated a second-order effect in which
fear-related learning occurred for a second animal seen
together with the animal that had previously been
paired with scared faces, even though the second
animals were never directly paired with fearful faces
themselves. Analyses indicated that the type of animal
(i.e. caterpillar or a marsupial) used as ﬁrst- or second-
order stimulus had no signiﬁcant effect on learning.
From a theoretical perspective, the current exper-
iment indicates that vicarious learning shares an
important characteristic of associative learning:
second-order conditioning (Rescorla, 1980). Similar
ﬁndings have been found with monkeys (Cook &
Mineka, 1987), but to our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst
demonstration in children of second-order condition-
ing following vicarious fear learning. The results indi-
cate that fear beliefs and avoidance can increase for
a stimulus that has not been directly involved in a
learning event, but can simply be associated with
another stimulus that was previously involved in a
fear-related vicarious learning event. Clinically, this is
a potential explanation for why some individuals
develop a particular fear or phobia but are unable to
remember a traumatic experience with the feared
stimulus (e.g. Davey, 1997). The feared stimulus may
not have been directly involved in a fear-related mod-
elling experience but have become associated with
another stimulus that has. Thus, the individual may
have no traumatic memory directly with the stimulus.
Interventions might be targeted at breaking the
association between these two stimuli (CS1 and CS2),
and also between the original “hidden” stimulus
(CS1) and the model’s fear response (US), neither of
which may initially be obviously associated with the
current feared stimulus (CS2).
A potential alternative explanation of the results is
that second-order conditioning might reﬂect direct
stimulus–response (S–R) learning rather than stimu-
lus–stimulus (CS1–CS2) learning. Recent research
(Reynolds, Field, & Askew, 2015) used an US revaluation
procedure to dissociate betweenCS–USandS–R associ-
ations, and provided evidence that CS–US associations
underpin vicarious learning. However, it may be that
second-order learning results from a direct association
between the CS2 and the CR elicited by the CS1 rather
than the CS1 itself. In this scenario, second-order vicar-
ious learning might represent a form of evaluative con-
ditioning (EC). Procedurally, Pavlovian and EC are the
same in that CRs result from pairing temporally contig-
uous stimuli, but functionally they are different
(Hofmann, De Houwer, Perugini, Baeyens, & Crombez,
2010). For example, theoretical accounts of EC suggest
that, unlike Pavlovian conditioning, CRs are driven not
only by direct associations formed between the CS
and US, but also by a direct link between the CS and
the evaluative response to the US; recent data have sub-
stantiated this claim (e.g. Gast & Rothermund, 2011).
The current study cannot disentangle whether the
second-order conditioning effects were driven by the
formation of a CS2–CS1 association or a CS2–CR1 associ-
ation because responses to CS1 were not measured
during the second-order conditioning phase and
there was no sensory-preconditioning condition. Con-
sequently, it is unclear whether the conditioned fear
responses observed to the second-order CS in the
current study resulted from stimulus–stimulus associ-
ations or from stimulus–response associations; which
also means it is unclear whether the learning resulted
from Pavlovian or EC. If the process was evaluative
then this has implications for the durability of second-
order CRs; for example, they should be more resistant
to extinction than if they are driven by Pavlovian mech-
anisms (e.g. Hofmann et al., 2010).
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In conclusion, the current study further supports that
vicarious learning is sufﬁcient to increase self-reported
fear beliefs and avoidance preferences for novel
animals, and additionally demonstrated that this
increase in fear beliefs can transfer to a second stimulus
not involved in the original learning event. The ﬁndings
may help explain why some individuals are unable to
recall a traumatic event associated with their fear or
phobia as well as informing how interventions should
be targeted. Future research could explore these inter-
ventions. For example, Davey and Arulampalam (1982)
demonstrated that extinguishing the ﬁrst-order fear
response does not necessarily also extinguish the
second-order fear response. If this is found to be the
case for second-order vicarious learning, then this
could have important implications for the treatment
of vicariously acquired fears and phobias.
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